Abstract: In this paper, we formulate, analyze, and devise methodologies to verify the notion of infinite-step opacity in discrete event systems that are modeled as (possibly non-deterministic) finite automata with partial observation on their transitions. Specifically, a system is infinitestep opaque if the entrance of the system state at any particular instant to a set of secret states remains opaque (uncertain), for the length of the system operation, to an intruder who observes system activity through some projection map. In other words, based on observations through this map (and complete knowledge of the system model), the intruder can never be certain (and will never be certain) that the system state at any point in time evolves (or has evolved) to the set of secret states. We show that infinite-step opacity can be verified via the construction of a set of appropriate state estimators. We also establish that the verification of infinite-step opacity is a PSPACE-hard problem.
INTRODUCTION
Motivated by the increased reliance on shared cyberinfrastructures in many application areas (ranging from defense and banking to health care and power distribution systems), various notions of security and privacy have received considerable attention from researchers. A number of such notions focus on characterizing the information flow from the system to the intruder [Focardi and Gorrieri (1994) ; Schneider and Sidiropoulos (1996) ]. Opacity falls in this category and aims at determining whether a given system's secret behavior (i.e., a subset of the behavior of the system that is considered critical and is usually represented by a predicate) is kept opaque to outsiders [Bryans et al. (2005b) ; Saboori and Hadjicostis (2007b) ]. More specifically, this requires that the intruder (modeled as a passive observer of the system's behavior) never be able to establish the truth of the predicate.
In our earlier work Hadjicostis (2007a,b, 2008) ], we considered opacity with respect to predicates that are state-based. More specifically, we considered a scenario where one is given a discrete event system (DES) that can be modeled as a (possibly non-deterministic) finite automaton with partial observation on its transitions. Assuming that the initial state of the system is (partially) unknown, we defined the secret behavior of the system as the evolution of the system's state to a subset of secret states S. The intruder is assumed to have full knowledge of the system model and to be able to track the observable transitions in the system via the observation of the associated labels. This notion of opacity requires that the secret behavior of the system remain opaque until the system enters a state outside the set of secret states S. In [Saboori and Hadjicostis (2007b) ], we extended this notion of opacity to K-step opacity (for K ≥ 0) by requiring that the entrance of the system state to the set of secret states S at any time during the past K observations remain opaque to the intruder. In other words, in a K-step opaque system the intruder cannot determine with certainty that the state of the system 0, 1, . . . , or K observations ago belonged to the set of secret states S.
In this work, we extend the notion of K-step opacity to infinite-step opacity by allowing the delay K to extend arbitrarily. Therefore, infinite-step opacity requires that, after having observed an arbitrary sequence of n observations (for any finite n), the intruder cannot determine with certainty that the state of the system 0, 1, 2, . . . , or n observations ago belonged to the set of secret states S.
In order to verify infinite-step opacity, we introduce an approach which uses a combination of current-state estimation [Caines et al. (1991) ] and initial-state estimation Hadjicostis (2007a, 2008) ]. We analyze the state-space complexity of this verification method and show that it is exponential in the square of the number of states of the system. We also show that the verification of infinite-step opacity is a PSPACE-hard problem and so it is unlikely that any algorithm can verify this property in polynomial time. Apart from our own work in Hadjicostis (2007a,b, 2008) ], the work in this paper is also related to some of the existing security work in the area of DESs. In particular, [Bryans et al. (2005a) ] focuses on finite state Petri nets and defines opacity with respect to state-based predicates; our work in [Saboori and Hadjicostis (2007a,b) ] and in this paper essentially extends this approach to finite automata for the cases of K-step opacity and infinite-step opacity. The authors of [Badouel et al. (2007) ] follow a language-based approach with multiple observers of varying observation capabilities (modeled through different observable transitions). Opacity in the setting of [Badouel et al. (2007) ] requires that no observer be able to establish with certainty that the actual trajectory of the system belongs to the secret language that is assigned to it; the case of one particular observer is later considered in [Dubreil et al. (2008) ]. In contrast to [Badouel et al. (2007) ] and [Dubreil et al. (2008) ], opacity in our framework assumes that the states of the system can be partitioned into secret and non-secret ones; this state-based formulation is what enables us to use various state estimators to verify opacity. Also, note that the notions of opacity introduced here are not considered in [Badouel et al. (2007) ] and [Dubreil et al. (2008) ].
PRELIMINARIES AND BACKGROUND
Let Σ be an alphabet and denote by Σ * the set of all finitelength strings of elements of Σ, including the empty string ǫ. A language L ⊆ Σ * is a subset of finite-length strings from strings in Σ * . For a string ω, ω denotes the prefixclosure of ω and is defined asω = {t ∈ Σ * | ∃s ∈ Σ * : ts = ω}. The post-string ω/s of ω after s is defined as ω/s = {t ∈ Σ * | st = ω}. For any string t, |t| denotes the length of t [Cassandras and Lafortune (1999) ; Wonham (2005) 
A DES is modeled in this paper as a (possibly nondeterministic) finite automaton G = (X, Σ, δ, X 0 ), where X = {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} is the set of states, Σ is the set of events, δ : X × Σ → 2 X (where 2 X is the power set of X) is the (partial and) possibly non-deterministic state transition function, and X 0 ⊆ X is the set of possible initial states. The function δ can be extended from the domain X×Σ to the domain X×Σ * in the routine recursive manner: δ(i, ts) := j∈δ(i,t) δ(j, s), for t ∈ Σ and s ∈ Σ * with δ(i, ǫ) := i. The behavior of DES G is captured by L(G) := {s ∈ Σ * | ∃i ∈ X 0 , δ(i, s) is defined}. We use L(G, i) to denote the set of all traces that originate from
In general, only a subset Σ obs of the events can be observed. Typically, one assumes that Σ can be partitioned into two sets, the set of observable events Σ obs and the set of unobservable events Σ uo . The natural projection P : Σ * → Σ * obs can be used to map any trace executed in the system to the sequence of observations associated with it. This projection is defined recursively as P (ts) = P (t)P (s), t ∈ Σ, s ∈ Σ * , with P (t) = t if t ∈ Σ obs and P (t) = ǫ if t ∈ Σ uo ∪{ǫ} [Cassandras and Lafortune (1999) ; Wonham (2005) ].
Upon observing some string (sequence of observations) s, the state of the system might not be identifiable uniquely due to the lack of knowledge of the initial state and the partial observation of events. We denote the set of states that the system might reside in given that s was observed as the current-state estimate. The current-state estimator is an automaton G 0,obs which captures these estimates [Caines et al. (1991) ]. Each state of G 0,obs is associated with a unique subset of states of the original DES G (so that there are at most 2 |X| = 2 N states). We denote this automaton by G 0,obs = AC(2 X , Σ obs , δ obs , X 0 ) where 2 X (power set of X) is the state set, Σ obs is the set of observable events, δ obs is the transition function, X 0 is the initial state, and AC is the part of the automaton that is accessible from initial state X 0 . Example 1. Consider the DES G in Figure 1 -a. Assuming that Σ obs = {α, β} and X 0 = X, then the current-state estimator G 0,obs in Figure 1 -b is constructed as follows. Next, starting from the initial state X 0 and observing α, the current state is any of the states in {2, 3, 4}; at this new state, the set of possible transitions is the union of all possible transitions for each of the states in {2, 3, 4}. Following this procedure, G 0,obs can be completed as in Figure 1 -b.
We now briefly review some necessary results and definitions from complexity theory (see [Garey and Johnson (1979) ] for further details). A problem is a parameterized question to be answered. An instance of a problem is obtained by specifying particular values for all problem parameters. A decision problem is one whose answer, depending on the instance, is either "yes" or "no". An algorithm solves a problem if it produces a correct answer when applied to any instance of the problem. The class of problems that can be solved by a polynomial-time algorithm is called P.
The class of decision problems that can be solved in polynomial space is called PSPACE. A PSPACE-hard problem is a decision problem such that any other decision problem in PSPACE can be reduced to this problem using a polynomial-time algorithm. If a PSPACE-hard problem is in PSPACE, then it is called PSPACE-complete. Showing that a problem is PSPACE-complete is strong evidence that the problem is computationally expensive.
INFINITE-STEP OPACITY
We first recall the notion of K-step opacity [Saboori and Hadjicostis (2007b) ]. Definition 1. (K-Step Opacity). Given a (possibly nondeterministic) finite automaton G = (X, Σ, δ, X 0 ), a projection map P with respect to the set of observable events Σ obs (Σ obs ⊆ Σ), and a set of secret states S ⊆ X, automaton G is K-step opaque (for some K ≥ 0) with respect to S and P (or (S, P, K)-opaque), if for all t ∈ Σ * , t ′ ∈t, and i ∈ X 0 ,
We say that t ∈ L(G) passes through S if there exists a string t ′ int that reaches a state in S. According to Definition 1, DES G is (S, P, K)-opaque if for every string t in L(G) that passes through S within the past K observations (i.e., for some t
there exists a string s in L(G) with P (s) = P (t) such that when string t passes through S, string s does not (i.e., for some s ′ ∈s such that
This notion is suitable for cases where there is a bounded delay, after which one does not care if the outside observer can infer information about behavior that was previously considered secret (e.g., because the secret transaction has completed or because the intrusion will be detected). However, in many applications the existence of such bound might not be viable. For this reason, in this paper, we extend the definition of (S, P, K)-opacity to cases where K → ∞. We call this notion infinite-step opacity and define it formally below. Definition 2. (Infinite-Step Opacity). Given a (possibly non-deterministic) finite automaton G = (X, Σ, δ, X 0 ), a projection map P with respect to the set of observable events Σ obs (Σ obs ⊆ Σ), and a set of secret states S ⊆ X, automaton G is infinite-step opaque with respect to S and P (or (S, P, ∞)-opaque), if for all t ∈ Σ * , t ′ ∈t, and
According to Definition 2, DES G is (S, P, ∞)-opaque if for every string t in L(G) that passes through S, there exists a string s in L(G) with P (s) = P (t) such that when string t passes through S, string s does not. In other words, infinite-step opacity requires that no string that can potentially be generated by the system can provide explicit information regarding the entrance of the system to the set of secret states at any point in time. Example 2. The notions of opacity we formulate in this paper can be used to answer interesting tracking questions in sensor networks. A typical example is that of a vehicle capable of moving on a two-dimensional space, where a number of sensors are deployed in the region and (due to sensor precision limitations) the grid is modeled as a 2-dimensional array of cells; in Figure 2 -a we provide a toy example of a 2×2 grid. The state of the vehicle corresponds to the coordinates (x, y) (or cell numbers) of its location in this grid, and any trajectory that the vehicle follows corresponds to a sequence of states.
In order to model vehicle movement limitations (due to physical obstacles or logical limitations in the vehicle motion), we use a kinematic model (a finite state machine) whose states are associated with the state (position) of the vehicle and whose transitions correspond to the possible movements of the vehicle at this position (up, right, diagonal, etc.); Figure 2 -b depicts an example of a kinematic model H for a vehicle that moves in the grid in Figure 2 -a.
Typically, the sensor network will not capture all movements of the vehicle and hence the observation of movements is partial. If each sensor detects the presence of the vehicle in a cell or in some aggregation of cells, then when the vehicle passes through a cell within the coverage of a sensor, this sensor will emit a signal to indicate this event. However, since sensors cannot determine the exact cell in their coverage area at which the vehicle resides, we enhance the kinematic model by assigning label α to all transitions that end in a cell that belongs to the coverage area of sensor α. The label of transitions ending in areas which are covered by more than one sensor can be chosen to be a special label that indicates the union of all the sensors covering that location. In Figure 2 -c, assuming that the coverage area of sensor α only includes cell 2 and that the coverage area of sensor β includes cells 0,2, and 3, we depict the (non-deterministic) automaton G that models both the kinematic model of the vehicle and the corresponding sensor readings. Dotted arrows correspond to transitions in locations that are not covered by any sensor.
One of the questions that might arise in the above context is that of characterizing all the trajectories (sequences of states) that a vehicle can follow such that the origin of each trajectory (initial-state) remains ambiguous to the sensor network. These trajectories can be of interest for a variety of reasons. For example, they can be employed to hide the origin of a trajectory from an observer who is employing the sensor network (i.e., who is observing the labels in Figure 2 -c) to identify whether the origin belongs to a set of secret (strategically important) locations or whether the vehicle passed from this particular set of locations at some instant of time. The latter question can be answered using the opacity framework of this paper.
INFINITE-STEP OPACITY VERIFICATION
In this section, we first recall the construction of the initialstate estimator in [Saboori and Hadjicostis (2008) ] and then discuss how it can be used to verify infinite-step opacity.
Initial State Estimation
Given a DES that can be modeled as a (possibly nondeterministic) finite automaton G = (X, δ, Σ, X 0 ) and a sequence of observations s, the initial-state estimation problem requires enumeration of all states that belong to the set of initial states X 0 , and could have generated this sequence of observations s. We call this estimate the initial-state estimateX 0 (s). In our earlier work [Saboori and Hadjicostis (2008) ], we introduced a (deterministic) finite automaton called initial-state estimator (ISE) which obtains initial-state estimates.
The ISE uses the notion of a state mapping to capture all the information included in any sequence of observations (of finite but arbitrary length) regarding the initial state of the system. A state mapping m ∈ 2 whose elements are pairs of states: the first component of each element (pair) is the starting state and the second component is the ending state; thus, for a state mapping m ∈ 2 X 2 , we use m(1) to denote the set of starting states and m(0) to denote the set of ending states. The induced state mapping for any observation s is defined in Hadjicostis (2007a, 2008) ] as a state mapping (of maximum cardinality) such that for any starting and ending state in a pair, there exists a sequence of events that starts from the starting state, ends at the ending state, and produces observation s. The composition operation on two state mappings results in a new state mapping that is obtained as follows: each element of the first state mapping can be combined with an element in the second mapping if the ending state of the former one is the same as the starting state of the latter one: the result is a pair with starting state taken to be the starting state of the first element and ending state taken to be the ending state of the second element. All such resulting pairs comprise the new (composed) mapping.
The ISE in Hadjicostis (2007a, 2008) ] utilizes state mappings as follows: each state of the ISE is associated with a unique state mapping and, since the initial state of the system belongs in X 0 , the mapping associated with the initial state is the mapping {(x, x)|x ∈ X 0 } (where starting and ending states are identical for all states in X 0 ). When the first observation is made, the induced state mapping corresponding to that observation is composed with the state mapping associated with the ISE initial state, resulting in the state mapping associated with the next state of the state estimator. The composition rule also defines subsequent state transitions: given a new observation, the ISE current state transitions into an ISE state whose associated state mapping is the composition of the state mapping associated with the ISE current state and the state mapping induced by the new observation. Continuing in this way we can build a structure which, at any given time, gives information about the current state and the initial state through the state mappings associated with each of its states. Note that this structure is guaranteed to be finite and has at most 2 N 2 states where N is the number of states of DES G. We denote the initialstate estimator by G ∞,obs = AC(2 X 2 , Σ obs , δ ∞,obs , X ∞,0 ) where 2 X 2 (power set of X 2 ) is the state set, Σ obs is the set of observable events, δ ∞,obs is the transition function, X ∞,0 = {(x, x)|x ∈ X 0 } is the initial state, and AC is the part of the automaton that is accessible from initial state X ∞,0 . Example 3. Consider the DES G of Figure 1 -a with Σ obs = {α, β}. Figure 3 shows the ISE for this system. The initial uncertainty is assumed to be equal to the state space and hence the initial state of the ISE m 0 is the state mapping {(0, 0), (1, 1), (2, 2), (3, 3), (4, 4)}. Upon observing α the next state of the ISE becomes {(0, 2), (0, 3), (2, 2), (4, 4)} ≡ m 1 . Observe that α can be observed only from states 0, 2 and 4. Moreover, if the initial state was 0, the current state could be any of the states in {2, 3}; if the initial state was 2, the current state could only be 2; whereas, if the initial state was 4, the current state would be 4. State mapping m 1 summarizes this information with its pairs (on the right of Figure 3 we use a graphical way to describe the pairs associated with the ISE). If, instead of α, we initially observe β, the state mapping that is induced by observing β is {(0, 1), (1, 4), (3, 4)} ≡ m 2 and implies that β can be observed from states 0, 1, and 3 and the respective current state can be either 1, 4, and 4. To take into account the observation α followed by observation β, we need to compose the state mapping m 1 with m 2 which results in {(0, 4)} ≡ m 4 . Using this approach for all possible observations (from each state), the ISE construction can be completed as shown in Figure 3 .
Verifying Infinite-Step Opacity Using a Bank of ISEs
In order to verify that a system is infinite-step opaque, we need to verify that at any point during the observation process, knowing the observation sequence before reaching that point, in addition to a possible future observation sequence (that is possible from that point onward), does not (and will not) allow us to determine whether the set of possible states at that point is a subset of the set of secret states. Hence, the verification consists of two phases: (i) finding all possible estimates of the system state along any possible sequence of observations, and (ii) for each point in this trajectory (set of possible system states), calculating the information that can be gained about the state at that point by possible observation sequences from that point onward. The first phase can be achieved via a standard current-state estimator which captures the estimate of the current state given a sequence of observations. The second phase requires the construction of an ISE-like state estimator for each possible uncertainty about the current state estimate (which is now used as the initial state estimate for the ISE-like state estimator). In other words, for each set of state estimates Z ⊆ X provided in the first phase, we construct an ISE whose initial state is associated with the state mapping {(z, z)|z ∈ Z}. Clearly, if any of these ISEs contains a state with associated state mapping m such that its set of starting states contains elements only in S (i.e., if m(1) ⊆ S), then DES G is not infinite-step opaque. The following theorem formalizes this discussion. The formal proof is omitted due to space considerations. Theorem 3. Consider a (possibly non-deterministic) finite automaton G = (X, Σ, δ, X 0 ), a projection map P with respect to the set of observable events Σ obs (Σ obs ⊆ Σ), and a set of secret states S ⊆ X. For each set of state estimates Z n associated with a state of its current-state estimator G 0,obs , construct the initial-state estimator G ∞,obs corresponding to state Z 4 = {2, 3, 4} in the current-state estimator of the DES G in Figure 1-a. the set of states in G (n) ∞,obs that is reachable from initial state X (n) ∞,0 = {(z, z)|z ∈ Z n }. Remark 1. In practice, since the set of initial state estimates can only decrease with additional observations, we only need to consider G (n) ∞,obs for Z n 's which have a nonempty intersection with S. Example 4. In this example, we show that DES G in Figure 1 -a is not ({3}, P, ∞)-opaque. To verify infinitestep opacity we need to first construct the current-state estimator G 0,obs as in Figure 1 -b. As mentioned in Example 1, this state estimator has five states Z 1 = {4}, Z 2 = {1, 4}, Z 3 = {2, 4}, Z 4 = {2, 3, 4}, Z 5 = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}; hence we need to construct five ISEs with initial states {(4, 4)}, {(1, 1), (4, 4)}, {(2, 2), (4, 4)}, {(2, 2), (3, 3), (4, 4)}, and {(0, 0), (1, 1), (2, 2), (3, 3), (4, 4)} respectively. However, among these initial states (i.e., state mappings) only state mapping {(0, 0), (1, 1), (2, 2), (3, 3), (4, 4)} which corresponds to Z 5 and state mapping {(2, 2), (3, 3), (4, 4)} which corresponds to state Z 4 contain the secret state 3. By Remark 1, this implies that we only need to construct the two ISEs that have these two state mappings as their initial states. (i) The ISE G Figure 1-b) that is reached via observation α. Putting these two pieces of information together, we can conclude that observing αβ reveals that the system has gone through state 3, which is a secret state.
The verification of infinite-step opacity using Theorem 3 requires that for each state of the current-state estimator, an ISE-like state estimator be constructed. Since there are at most 2 N states for the current-state estimator, this implies that the complexity of this method is O(2 N × 2
). This exponential complexity is not desirable for implementation purposes; as we show in the following section, however, it is unlikely that any algorithm can verify this property in polynomial time.
Verification of Infinite-Step Opacity is PSPACE-Hard
In order to characterize the complexity class of infinitestep opacity verification (INF) problem, we first study the complexity of verifying initial-state opacity introduced in our earlier work [Saboori and Hadjicostis (2008) ] and show that each instance of the initial-state opacity verification (INI) problem can be reduced (via an algorithm that has complexity polynomial in the number of states of automaton G) to an instance of the INF problem. This proves that the INF problem is at least as hard as the INI problem. Then, we show that the INI problem, for |Σ obs | > 1, is PSPACE-complete which in turn proves that the INF problem is PSPACE-hard for |Σ obs | > 1. The following definition describes initial-state opacity formally. Definition 4. (Initial-State Opacity). Given a (possibly non-deterministic) finite automaton G = (X, Σ, δ, X 0 ), a projection map P with respect to the set of observable events Σ obs (Σ obs ⊆ Σ), and a set of secret states S ⊆ X, automaton G is initial-state opaque with respect to S and P (or (S, P, ∞) initial-state opaque), if for all i ∈ X 0 ∩ S and for all t ∈ L(G, i) there exists j ∈ X 0 − S and s ∈ L(G, j) such that P (s) = P (t).
According to Definition 4, system G is (S, P, ∞) initialstate opaque if for every string t that originates from an initial state in the secret set S there exists a string s that originates from a system initial state outside the set of secret states S and has the same projection as t. While for infinite-step opacity we require that the membership of the system state to the set of secret states S should remain opaque to outsiders at all times, for initial-state opacity, this is only required at startup time (i.e., for the initial state of the system). Therefore, if none of the secret states of system G is reachable after startup (i.e., if none of the strings in the system can pass through the set of secret states except at startup), then it is not hard to see that infinite-step opacity and initial-state opacity become equivalent. In the following theorem, we use this insight to reduce each instance of the INI problem to an instance of the INF problem. The formal proof is again omitted in the interest of space. Theorem 5. Given a (possibly non-deterministic) finite automaton G = (X, Σ, δ, X 0 ), a projection map P with respect to the set of observable events Σ obs (Σ obs ⊆ Σ), and a set of secret states S ⊆ X, define the (possibly nondeterministic) finite automatonĜ = (X, Σ,δ, X 0 ) with state setX constructed from X by adding duplicates ≡ x. Then, DES G is initial-state opaque with respect to S and P if and only if automatonĜ is infinite-step opaque with respect tô S = S ∩ X 0 and P .
